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REVIEW ESSAYS/NOTES CRITIQUE
History, Law and the Mi’kmaq of Atlantic Canada
THE INTENSE PUBLIC CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING the Donald Marshall
Junior eel fishing trials has served regional history well. The original trial (at which
Marshall’s treaty rights defense was rejected) featured only the testimony of
historians. Research used at the trial has been rewritten for scholarly publication,
various symposia have been held on the subject and the Supreme Court of Canada
included an extended methodological discussion in the decision that finally acquitted
Marshall by accepting the legitimacy of his defense.1 Other scholarly work has
developed around Mi’kmaq history, in part in an attempt to translate the work of
historians into a wider public discourse that could contribute to the amelioration of
tensions between Native and non-Native Atlantic Canadians.2 In this regard, the legal
and public controversies surrounding Aboriginal treaty rights in Atlantic Canada have
helped to advance an important historiographic agenda, illustrating the significance of
historical research and contributing to a wider understanding of the processes that
have structured interaction between Native and non-Native peoples in the Atlantic
region.
William Wicken’s Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land, and Donald
Marshall Junior (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002) is an important book
that both emerges out of the legal wrangling surrounding regional Aboriginal rights
and marks a clear advance in interpreting processes of Native/non-Native interaction
in Atlantic Canada. Wicken was one of the key expert witnesses supporting
Marshall’s defense, but Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial is much more than a “brief for the
defense”. It is the first extended work since L.F.S. Upton’s Micmacs and Colonists to
address the meanings and implications of the British/Mi’kmaq conflicts that enflamed
Maritime Canada in the first 60 years of the 18th century.3 Through cautious and
thorough research Wicken not only revises Upton’s conclusions but also raises
important new questions about the history of Native/non-Native interaction in the
Maritimes. My objective in this review is to analyze Wicken’s interpretation and
suggest how it provides the basis for reorienting research into the regional history of
Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations. The great merit of this text lies not simply in its
effective historical scholarship, but in its nuanced and suggestive interpretation. It is
part of an important historiographical shift in writing the history of Atlantic Canadian
First Nations, a long-overdue shift that effectively “modernizes” research on
Aboriginal peoples in the region.
In 1993, Donald Marshall Junior, a man already well known for the legal
Andrew Nurse, “History, Law and the Mi’kmaq”, Acadiensis, XXXIII, 2 (Spring
2004), pp. 126-33.
11780-07 Nurse Review  8/16/04  9:58 AM  Page 126
History, Law and the Mi’kmaq 127
discrimination he had suffered and his unjust internment for a murder he did not
commit,4 was charged with three different offenses under the federal Fisheries Act.
Conceding that he had been fishing and selling eels, Marshall argued that he had a
treaty right do so pursuant to the 18th-century Peace and Friendship treaties that ended
military conflict between the British Crown and the Mi’kmaq Nation. His defense,
supported by the Union of Nova Scotia Indians and the Confederacy of Mainland
Micmacs, was built around the continued legitimacy of these rights.5 That defense was
not novel. Maritime First Nations have a long but little-known history of defending
the rights specified in the Peace and Friendship treaties against unilateral state
regulation.6 What was novel, for Atlantic Canada at least, was the seriousness with
which all levels of the judiciary treated historical testimony. The thrust of Mi’kmaq
Treaties on Trial is to tell both of these stories. First, Wicken’s text is a re-
interpretation of the extended military conflict for control of Nova Scotia leading to
the Peace and Friendship treaties. Second, it is designed to explain how Donald
Marshall Junior ended up on trial for violating the federal Fisheries Act, how the
treaty rights of the Mi’kmaq Nation were discarded by the colonial then federal states
and how Nova Scotia courts used history to justify the original conviction.
Wicken devotes by far the most space to the first of these objectives. In an
empirically grounded, careful and nuanced analysis of extant primary records, he
examines the competing value systems, negotiations and material circumstances that
led first to the 1726 treaty that ended the second major conflict between the Mi’kmaq
and the British and, subsequently, to the better known 1760-61 treaties that confirmed
peaceful relations between the Crown and Maritime First Nations. In developing his
interpretation, Wicken takes issue with the conclusions reached in other historical
studies. Most importantly, he clearly rejects the contention, made by a variety of
different scholars, that Mi’kmaq culture and autonomy had already been
fundamentally compromised by the mid-18th century. While this line of interpretation
has a long history, its first significant modern treatment can be found in the now-
discredited work of Calvin Martin.7
According to Martin, a series of circumstances – including, most importantly,
disease – led the Mi’kmaq to reject their own cosmology and abrogate the fine
reciprocal balance they had maintained between themselves and the local ecology. For
Martin, the influx of European diseases proved little less than an unmitigated disaster,
both physically and culturally. In the face of decimating disease, the Mi’kmaq
adopted a new and careless ecological ethic that produced drastic overhunting and
trade dependency. While Martin’s original interpretation has not withstood sustained
historical critique,8 the basic interpretation implied by his argument has proven more
4 Michael Harris, Justice Denied: The Law versus Donald Marshall (Toronto, 1986); Joy Mannette, ed.,
Elusive Justice: Beyond the Marshall Inquiry (Halifax, 1992).
5 Details relating to the trial are drawn from Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial, pp. 4-14. 
6 R. v. Syliboy [1928] 50 C.C.C. 389, http://library.usask.ca/native/cnlc/vol04/430.html. See also Janet
E. Chute, The Long Road Back: Origins of the Nova Scotian Mi’kmaq Land and Resource Campaign
(Shubenacadie, 1999).
7 Calvin Martin, “The European Impact on the Culture of a Northeastern Algonquian Tribe: An
Ecological Interpretation”, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 31 (1974), pp. 3-26.
8 Sheppard Krech III, ed., Indians, Animals, and the Fur Trade: A Critique of “Keepers of the Game”
(Athens, 1981).
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appealing to historians. While rejecting much of what Martin had to say about shifts
in Mi’kmaq cosmology, other historical interpretations tended to support the idea that
increased interaction with Europeans produced both fundamental cultural change and
worked to severely limit political autonomy. In one way or another, L.F.S. Upton,
Olive Dickason and Stephen Patterson have made this point.9
The most overt is Patterson, who argues that Mi’kmaq autonomy was maintained
into the mid-18th century only by the balance of French and British forces in Nova
Scotia. With the collapse of French power in the region, Mi’kmaq political autonomy
became at best decidedly more limited. In Patterson’s view, the Peace and Friendship
treaties represent the logical outcome of this changed circumstance. The Mi’kmaq,
fighting what they understood to be a losing battle, and the British, negotiating from
a position of strength, created a colonial legal system that established British
sovereignty over Nova Scotia and the Mi’kmaq. By 1760 the Mi’kmaq leadership had
little option but to accept whatever deal was offered. According to Patterson, the terms
of the deal are clear: the British Crown, in the form of the colonial administration and
then later the provincial and federal states, held sole legal authority over Nova Scotia
with the legitimate right to make law unilaterally, including the regulation of the
Mi’kmaq economy.10
Wicken’s interpretation of the Peace and Friendship treaties, the process of
negotiation and the events surrounding them could not be more different. His
argument is not that the Mi’kmaq nation was unaffected by its extended conflict with
the British empire, but that the social, cultural and political changes that took place
were less drastic than previous historical studies suggest. At the time of the first treaty
in 1726, the form of the treaty, the process of ratification and its specific terms all
indicate that the Mi’kmaq struggle to preserve their autonomy against European
colonization had met with a measure of success. While trade had altered their
economy, it was far from a state of dependency. The Mi’kmaq did maintain good
relations with the French on Île Royale, but they were far from puppets of French
administrators. Indeed, there were actually few priests on mainland Nova Scotia and
the degree to which the Mi’kmaq generally spoke or even understood French has been
overestimated. Wicken contends that the Mi’kmaq relied on translators who
understood both languages and that within their own communities Mi’kmaq remained
the only language spoken.
What is perhaps most important to this interpretation, however, is that the cultural
values that animated Mi’kmaq life had not been destroyed. The Mi’kmaq had their
own long tradition of treaty making and, if outside information was needed, they
would have relied on other Aboriginal peoples (with whom they were allied) rather
than the French or British for their understanding of the implications of the treaties.
9 Upton, Micmacs and Colonists, especially pp. xii-xiii for a clear statement of his argument; Olive
Patricia Dickason, “Amerindians between French and English”, in J.R. Miller, ed., Sweet Promises:
A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto, 1991), pp. 45-67; Stephen E. Patterson,
“1744-1763: Colonial Wars and Aboriginal Peoples”, in Phillip A. Buckner and John G. Reid, eds.,
The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History (Toronto and Fredericton, 1994), pp. 125-55;
Stephen E. Patterson,“Indian-White Relations in Nova Scotia, 1749-61”, Acadiensis, 23, 1 (Autumn
1993), pp. 23-59.
10 Patterson, “1744-1763”, p. 126.
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In other words, the assumption that the Crown brought to the Donald Marshall Junior
trial – that the Mi’kmaq operated with a near full and complete understanding of
European treaty-making processes – is at best an intensely problematic assumption.
There is no reason to assume that this was the case and, in the absence of supporting
evidence, other interpretations should be evaluated.
For Wicken, understanding a Mi’kmaq perspective on the treaties is not simply a
matter of suggesting that an alternative hypothesis is plausible and that the
interpretation suggested by the Crown lacks supporting empirical evidence. Instead,
Wicken argues the weight of evidence is actually the other way. The British
negotiated treaties with the Mi’kmaq leadership in part using the protocols of the
Mi’kmaq people. How else, he argues, can one explain the elaborate ceremonies at
Halifax in 1760? If the treaty-making process reflected the interests and power of
Great Britain alone, why were chiefs treated like dignitaries? Why was a process of
ritual confirmation used? Why was a process of community ratification among the
Mi’kmaq followed and accepted by the British colonial administration?
In Wicken’s view, a close reading of the treaties also supports this interpretation.
The treaties, he argues, both in 1726 and later, were the work of local colonial officials
and so reflected their assessment of British needs. These may have been different than
the perceptions of imperial officials in London. For Wicken, this suggests that there
is no reason to believe that imperial conceptions of treaties and their meanings were
operative in Nova Scotia in the middle decades of the 18th century. Provisions of the
treaties that ensured the Mi’kmaq “unmolested” access to the land and natural
resources of the region and that limited British colonization to existing settlements
and those “lawfully to be made” suggest that British colonial officials recognized
Aboriginal sovereignty. Moreover, such provisions could be legitimately interpreted
by the Mi’kmaq as part of a reciprocal agreement through which the British Crown
bound itself to respect Mi’kmaq autonomy outside of pre-existing British
settlements.11
According to Wicken, a key clause in the 1726 treaty spells out this new
relationship. The second part of the second clause of the treaty reads, in part, as
follows: the Mi’kmaq “make Submission to his said Majesty in as Ample a Manner
as wee have formerly done to the Most Christian [French] King”.12 The Mi’kmaq,
Wicken argues, would have interpreted this clause to indicate that their relationship
with the British Crown was substantively similar to their former relationship to the
French Crown. The important point here is that the relationship between the French
and the Mi’kmaq was not one of dominance and subjugation in which the French
empire superceded the autonomy of the Mi’kmaq people and controlled the land and
resources of the old colony of Acadia. The Mi’kmaq leadership, then, would have
viewed this treaty as a continuity in which their legal and political relationship to the
British Crown was no different than their former legal and political relationship to the
French Crown.
For their part, the British had good reason to accept the terms of these treaties, even
if they promised a general acceptance of Mi’kmaq autonomy and ceded rights to the
11 Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial, ch. 5.
12 Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial, p. 110.
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use of natural resources. In particular, the wars against the Mi’kmaq and other Native
peoples of northeastern North America had been costly.13 Maintaining the armed force
necessary to fight the Mi’kmaq and other Native peoples cost the British treasury
more than it liked; the wars harmed the fishing economy of New England by making
fishing off Nova Scotia a dangerous pursuit. Wicken reports that colonial officials in
Nova Scotia and Massachusetts were under direction from London to reduce the cost
of the colonial enterprise. Moreover, the results of war were uncertain. Even as late as
the 1760 treaty ceremony at Halifax, it was not clear that the British would emerge
victorious in eastern Canada or that the territory would be retained after a European
peace treaty between the belligerent great powers. In this circumstance, the British
were willing to accept Mi’kmaq rights and guarantee a commercial trade in natural
resources as the price of peace. Set in this context and with these considerations,
Wicken argues that Marshall’s later defense has historical weight behind it. The
treaties do not subjugate the Mi’kmaq people to the British Crown; they established
rights to use of land and resources and a commercial right to that use.
It is one thing to assert these conclusions; it is another to provide supporting
evidence. This is a point often lost both in historiographic debate and in Canadian
courts’ determination of what constitutes historical “fact”. In the original
Delgamuukw trial in British Columbia, for example, the trial judge reached
questionable conclusions about history based on whose argument he found more
believable. Recent scholarly studies critical of Aboriginal rights have tended to follow
this same line of argument but in reverse. Tom Flanagan, for example, in his well-
known First Nations, Second Thoughts, comes close to dismissing historical studies
that lend support to Aboriginal rights claims as little more than intensely biased and
ideologically driven misrepresentations of the past.14
Historical research is profoundly affected by narrative strategies, but good history
is not detached from empirical evidence.15 One of the ways in which Wicken attempts
to differentiate Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial from other studies of British-Mi’kmaq
conflict and the Peace and Friendship treaties is methodological. His approach, he
says, represents an effort to read the treaties as “oral text[s] written into alphabetic
form”.16 Here, Wicken continues a line of distinction noted in the courts. This
distinction is crucial to the second story that Wicken seeks to tell: the historical
process that led to the original Marshall trial. According to Wicken, the process that
led Marshall to trial developed out of the conflict of oral and textual treatments of the
Peace and Friendship treaties. The passage of time, the marginalization of the Mi’kmaq
Nation and the increased power of European settlers and the colonial state obscured the
13 Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial, p. 82. See also Kenneth Morrison, The Embattled Northeast: The
Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euro-American Relations (Berkeley, 1984).
14 Tom Flanagan, First Nations, Second Thoughts (Montreal and Kingston, 2000). For critical
treatments of the process through which different courts have drawn conclusion about historical
“fact”, see Dara Culhane, The Pleasure of the Crown: Anthropology, Law and First Nations
(Burnaby, BC, 1998) and Arthur J. Ray, “Creating the Image of the Savage in Defence of the Crown:
The Ethnohistorian in Court”, Native Studies Review, 6, 2 (1990), pp. 13-29.
15 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore,
1973); Peter Gay, Style in History (New York, 1974).
16 Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial, p. 140.
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context and meaning of the treaties, leaving later generations with only the written
treaties, devoid of historical context. The end result was a simplistic and biased
understanding of the treaties on the part of colonial and later provincial and federal
officials: “In this way, the British simplified future understandings of the treaty by
extracting the written treaty from the oral context in which it had been created,
remembered and later modified. Mi’kmaq perspectives became less important”.17
This second story, which Wicken makes more by implication than extended
analysis, is as important as his treatment of the treaty-making process. Here, Wicken
provides a similarly nuanced framework for future studies that utilizes a different
interpretive approach to the process of colonization. He portrays colonialism as a
process of economic, social and political marginalization that entailed the legalistic
subjugation of the Mi’kmaq. He sees this as a discursive process in which historical
knowledge and the rules of national interaction in the Atlantic region were
increasingly organized by a particular textualized approach to problems of rights and
autonomy.18 It would be interesting to follow up this argument with analyses of the
ways in which the textual culture of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal interaction in the
Atlantic region developed between 1760-61 and the Donald Marshall Junior trial.
Such a study would be difficult but it would clearly add to the story Wicken has told
in Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial. Without more extensive research, however, the most we
can say at this point is that Wicken has ventured an interesting and innovative
hypothesis in his approach to this part of the story.
The implications of Wicken’s text extend beyond a potentially innovative narrative
that could enrich our understanding of the process of colonization. In this regard, two
further issues are important. First, in terms of narrative, Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial
suggests a different way of writing the history of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal
interaction in Atlantic Canada. Instead of writing this history as a process of cultural
demise, it is possible to build on Wicken’s analysis to sketch out a different history of
interaction in which the processes of historical change did not completely overcome
Mi’kmaq resistance to colonization and within which some measure of cultural,
economic and political autonomy was maintained.
To be clear on this point: the disturbing violence of a colonial order for a  people
like the Mi’kmaq needs to occupy a prominent place in any future narrative of
Native/non-Native interaction. Such a clear recognition of the violence of the colonial
order, however, need not be the entire story. To say this differently, the narrative of
Mi’kmaq/non-Mi’kmaq interaction in the Atlantic region need not be solely a story of
the increasing marginalization of Native peoples.19 The narrative of marginalization
17 Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial, p. 221.
18 For a similar approach to cultural development in Canada, see Gerald Friesen, Citizens and Nation:
An Essay on History, Communications and Canada (Toronto, 1999).
19 This is the impression one might gain from reading general studies of Atlantic history focusing on the
post-1760 era. For example, see J.M Bumsted, “1763-1783: Resettlement and Rebellion” in Buckner
and Reid, The Atlantic Region to Confederation, pp. 156-83; Ann Gorman Condon, “1783-1800:
Loyalist Arrival and Acadian Return” in Buckner and Reid, The Atlantic Region to Confederation, pp.
184-209; Graeme Wynn, “1800-1810: Turning the Century”, in Buckner and Reid, The Atlantic
Region to Confederation, pp. 210-23; D.A. Sutherland, “1810-1820: War and Peace”, in Buckner and
Reid, The Atlantic Region to Confederation, pp. 234-60.
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neglects many things, including the ways in which the Mi’kmaq and other First
Nations actually interacted with the state, gender relations, the social history of daily
life and processes of cultural change and development, and the actual course of the
legal and political history of resistance to colonialism. In point of fact, other historians
have already begun to explore the dynamics of colonialism as a legal order for
Maritime Aboriginal peoples, the points of interaction between Aboriginal peoples
and the state and the effects of colonialism on regional First Nations cultures.20
Writing this history will provide a complex narrative in which state action and
inaction, ecological changes brought by non-Aboriginal settlement, personal character
traits, ideas and the dynamic character of First Nations culture interact to structure
lived historical experience.21 As with the lived experiences of other Atlantic
Canadians, detailed studies of Maritime First Nations histories will reveal people
living complicated lives, torn between differing ideals, interacting with their children
in complex ways and struggling to extend the realm of freedom beyond the
subjugation of the colonizing state. An effective way to develop this type of historical
research would be to follow the work of previous social historians and write
community studies. Such studies would, necessarily, need to involve the communities
themselves. They may, in fact, be conducted by community members. By examining
particularly the era after the Peace and Friendship treaties from a social-historical
perspective that takes into account the dynamics and power of the colonial state,
historians could write regional First Nations histories on a level with other areas of
regional historical enquiry.
The second important implication relates to Wicken’s reading the Peace and
Friendship treaties as “oral texts”. He argues that this approach allows historians to
more effectively determine the meanings of the Peace and Friendship treaties for the
Mi’kmaq people of the 18th century. His focus on the orality of 18th-century
Mi’kmaq culture mirrors a general trend toward the increased acceptance by Canadian
courts of the legitimacy of oral histories maintained by Aboriginal peoples.22 The
distinction made here is that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples organize
historical memory differently. Non-Native Canadian society organizes its memory
through written texts; Native societies, as oral societies, kept records through other
mnemonic devices and oral traditions. To privilege the written text in, for example, a
treaty rights or land claim trial is to bias the results against Aboriginal peoples and
20 Bill Parenteau and James Kenny, “Survival, Resistance, and the Canadian State: The Transformation
of New Brunswick’s Native Economy, 1867-1930”, Journal of the Canadian Historical Association,
new series, 13 (2002): pp. 49-71; Ruth B. Phillips, Trading Identities: The Souvenir in Native North
American Art from the Northeast, 1700-1900 (Montreal and Kingston, 1998); Bill Wicken, “Mi’kmaq
Land in Southwestern Nova Scotia, 1771-1823”, in Margaret Conrad, ed., Making Adjustments:
Change and Continuity in Planter Nova Scotia, 1759-1800 (Fredericton, 1991).
21 Theresa Redmond, “‘We Cannot Work Without Food’: Nova Scotia Indian Policy and Mi’kmaq
Agriculture, 1783-1867”, in David T. McNab, ed., Earth, Water, Air and Fire: Studies in Canadian
Ethnohistory (Waterloo, 1998), pp. 115-25; Janet E. Chute, “Mi’kmaq Fishing in the Maritimes: A
Historical Overview”, in McNab, Earth, Water, Air and Fire, pp. 95-113.
22 For a discussion of the changing ways in which the courts have approached Aboriginal and treaty
rights cases, see Brian Slattery, “Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights”, Canadian Bar
Review, 79, 2 (July 2000), pp. 196-224 and John Borrows, “Uncertain Citizens: Aboriginal Peoples
and the Supreme Court”, Canadian Bar Review, 80, 1&2 (March-June 2002), pp. 15-41.
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thus infringe on principles of natural justice to which Canadian society is,
theoretically at least, committed.23 The expansion of oral history in Aboriginal rights
(treaty and otherwise) and claims trials, therefore, makes sense if one accepts the
values to which liberal intellectuals have argued Canada should be committed.
As a legal principle, the courts’ acceptance of oral history is to be commended.
Whether or not this distinction makes sense for 21st-century historical research is
another question. Historians now have a generation of intensive experience with oral
history, and good historical research has never been about excluding potential sources
of information.24 In some ways, in fact, Wicken’s methodological strategy of reading
the Mi’kmaq Peace and Friendship treaties as “oral texts” – best understood only by
a rigorous analysis of the contemporary cultural and linguitic barriers and the specific
social and political aspirations of the two parties – is simple, effective historical
research.
If my analysis of Wicken’s methodology is correct, the implications are important
for a reconsideration of First Nations history in the Atlantic region. They suggest, for
example, that distinctions drawn between different paths to historical knowledge (oral
versus textual) might not be as wide as they first appear and that the work of
professional historians (using Wicken’s work as a model) empirically corroborates the
oral historiography of Maritime Aboriginal peoples. In other words, the ideological
distinction that critics of Aboriginal rights, like Flanagan, draw is more mystification
than reality. In place of this, the real distinction might be between good historical
research and weak historical research where sources of information, proper
contextualization and attention to linguistic nuance are ignored in favour of biased
treatments of the Aboriginal past.
Such a conclusion might seem controversial. In effect, I am arguing that Wicken’s
research provides a model for future scholarship and suggests a new historiographical
agenda that is already developing. This model should be relatively easy for historians
to implement because it asks very little of them. In effect, it does not ask them to
methodologically or heuristically retool. It asks them only to be good historians and
to explore the dynamics of regional First Nations history with the same care, attention
to evidence and detail that revolutionized the study of regional history in the last
generation. If this can be accomplished, even more of the great merits of Mi’kmaq
Treaties on Trial will be realized.
ANDREW NURSE
23 Pierre Trudeau, “The Values of a Just Society”, in Pierre Trudeau and Tom Axworthy, eds., Towards
a Just Society: The Trudeau Years, trans. Patricia Claxton (Markham, Ont., 1990); Michael Ignatieff,
The Rights Revolution (Concord, Ont., 2000).
24 Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History (New York, 1978).
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